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Noriega's Abduction from Panama: Is




The United States indicted General Manuel Antonio Noriega,
Commander-in-Chief of the Panama Defense Forces ("PDF") and de
facto leader of Panama, on February 4, 1988.' The twelve-count in-
dictment accused Noriega of accepting a $4.6 million bribe from the
Medellin cartel to protect shipments of cocaine, launder money, sup-
ply drug labs, and shield drug traffickers from the law. It also ac-
cused Noriega of allowing smugglers to use Panama as a way station
for United States-bound cocaine, using his official position to provide
protection for international drug traffickers, and arranging for the
shipment of cocaine-processing chemicals.
2
The United States did not attempt to use formal extradition pro-
cedures to apprehend Noriega. Instead, President George Bush au-
thorized a full-scale military invasion of the Republic of Panama to,
among other things, abduct Noriega. On December 20, 1989, the
United States launched Operation Just Cause.3 As part of the opera-
tion, President Bush issued a memorandum to the Secretary of De-
1. On February 4, 1988, grand juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida indicted Noriega on
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organized Activities ("RICO") violations. RICO viola-
tions occur when a defendant uses a pattern of racketeering activities, or the proceeds of those
activities, to affect an interstate enterprise. J. RAKOFF & H. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 1.06 (1990). RICO violations are codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a), (b) and (c). For a discussion of Noriega's status as Commander-in-Chief of the
PDF and as de facto leader of Panama, see infra text accompanying notes 7-47.
2. Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988); see
also Indictments Depict Noriega as Drug-Trafficking Kingpin: U.S. Had Long Backed Panama-
nian Leader, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1988, at Al. See infra text accompanying notes 48-65 for an
in-depth discussion of the Florida indictments.
3. Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in Panama, 25
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1974 (Dec. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Address to the Nation]; see also
Saul, Dispute Over Legality, Newsday, Dec. 21, 1989, at 4 (city ed.); Fighting in Panama: The
State Dept.-Excerpts from Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989,
§ A, at 19, col. 3; see also Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494-97 (1990). In the invasion of Panama, the United
States deployed over 26,000 troops, roughly half of whom joined United States forces perma-
nently stationed in Panama. Twenty-three United States servicemen and two United States
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fense authorizing the use of United States armed forces to apprehend
General Noriega.
4
President Bush justified the invasion of the Republic of Panama
on three additional bases, including: protecting American lives in
Panama; responding to Noriega's declaration of war against the
United States; and assisting the return to power of the lawful and
democratically-elected government in Panama. 5 The United States
coerced Noriega into surrendering ten days after the invasion began
and transported him to the United States to face drug trafficking
charges.
6
This Comment analyzes whether the United States' justifications
for the military action in Panama are consistent with international
law. It focuses specifically on the abduction of General Noriega to
face trial in the United States. Was the abduction a permissible cir-
cumvention of the formal extradition procedure or was it, because of
its extreme nature, a lawless act violating United States and interna-
tional laws?
In answering the above questions, this Comment first examines
the factual background and political nature of the Noriega case. Sec-
ond, it analyzes the Miami and Tampa, Florida indictments and the
events leading up to the invasion of Panama and Noriega's apprehen-
sion. Third, this Comment scrutinizes the United States' official justi-
fications for the military actions in Panama. It questions whether the
United States' rationale and purported legal basis for Noriega's appre-
hension outside the extradition procedure are valid in light of gov-
erning treaties and customary inteinational norms. In general, this
Comment examines the Bush administration's political concerns and
whether they justify the extraordinary actions taken. In conclusion,
this Comment analyzes the ramifications of the United States' inva-
sion of Panama and their effect on the credibility and usefulness of
international law.
civilians were killed in the invasion. Panamanian casualties included scores of civilians and at
least 240 members of the PDF. United Press Int'l, Jan. 4, 1990.
4. Memorandum Directing the Apprehension of General Manuel Noriega and Others in
Panama Indicted in the United States for Drug Related Offenses, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1976 (Dec. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Memorandum Directing Apprehension].
5. See generally Address to the Nation, supra note 3; Nanda, supra note 3, at 494-501.




A. Noriega's Rise and Fall-A Brief Background
of the Noriega Case
Noriega became the head of the Panama National Guard's intel-
ligence branch ("G-2"), under the regime of General Omar Torrijos,
in 1972. 7 This gave Noriega access and control over the exchange and
transmission of military intelligence, criminal investigations, customs,
and immigration." As the head of G-2, Noriega became useful to the
United States' political-military interests in Latin America. 9 Noriega
was allegedly on the payrolls of the United States Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") and the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA") of the
United States Department of Defense.' 0
In 1981, General Omar Torrijos died in a plane crash." In the
ensuing power struggle, the now politically powerful Noriega12 care-
fully maneuvered his way past other National Guard commanders to
take full control of the military.' 3 By 1983, Noriega emerged as the
7. Comment, An Inquiry Regarding the International and Domestic Legal Problems
Presented in United States v. Noriega, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 393, 397 (1989).
8. Cooper, Lane, Norland, Gonzales, Parker & Sandza, Drugs, Money & Death, NEWS-
WEEK, Feb. 15, 1988, at 32. Reports alleged that Noriega provided valuable assistance to the
CIA by using Panama as a base of intelligence operations in Central America. Noriega also
allegedly supplied the United States with intelligence information on Cuba. A Skilled Dealer
With U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at 18, col. 1; see also The Noriega Case: Intelligence
Operations; US. Worry: What Damage Can Noriega Do, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
9. For example, Noriega aided the United States government in training Nicaraguan
rebels to fight the Sandinistas. Robinson, Dwindling Options in Panama, FOREIGN AFF. 187,
189 (1989).
10. Ciolli, Saul, Royce & Esposite, CIA Connection Seen As Key Issue in Battling US.
Drug Charges, Newsday, Jan. 5, 1990, at 3 (city ed.). Reportedly, Noriega was on the CIA's
payroll during President Bush's term as CIA director from 1975 to 1976. Id. Indeed, testi-
mony before Congress has indicated that Noriega was trafficking drugs while simultaneously
assisting various United States administrations in curbing the drug trade. Id.
Bush had two meetings with Noriega, one during his tenure as CIA director and another
in 1983. Id. The late CIA Director, William Casey, former National Security Advisor, John
Poindexter, and other officials in the Reagan administration also met with Noriega. Id. In
1988, Panamanian diplomat Jose Blandon testified before Congress about Noriega's longstand-
ing relationship with various United States intelligence agencies. Id.; see generally Bruck, How
Noriega Got Caught and Got Away, AM. LAW., at 35 (July/Aug. 1988).
11. Frontline: The Noriega Connection (KCET television broadcast, Jan. 30, 1990) (tran-
script on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal)
[hereinafter The Noriega Connection]. Some of Noriega's opponents were convinced that
Noriega engineered the crash. Id.
12. Id.; see also Arias Calderon, Panama: Disaster or Democracy, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 328,
333 (Winter 1987/88).
13. Bruck, supra note 10, at 35. Noriega became commandant after striking a deal with
Ruben Paredes and Roberto Diaz Herrera in August 1983. Id.
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chief of the PDF and the leader of Panama.
14
Politically, Noriega aligned himself with then President Reagan's
anti-communist agenda to gain the United States' favor.' 5 Noriega
ingratiated himself with the Reagan administration by allegedly as-
sisting Nicaraguan Contra rebels with financial and military aid.
16
While Noriega helped the United States fight communism in Central
America, he secretly furthered his financial interests by allegedly
striking deals with the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia.'
7
Throughout the early 1980s, Noriega steadily consolidated his
political power within Panama. Noriega backed Nicolas Ardito
Barletta, former World Bank vice president, in the 1984 Panamanian
presidential election. Noriega created a coalition of pro-government
political parties, known as the National Democratic Union
("UNADE"), to support Barletta.' 8 Consequently, Barletta defeated
Dr. Arnulfo Arias, a long-time active politician.' 9 However, this vic-
tory was marred by charges of blatant electoral fraud20 and Barletta's
presidency was short-lived.
2'
In August 1985, Dr. Hugo Spadafora allegedly spoke with
United States Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agents in Costa
Rica regarding Noriega's narcotics ties. 22 Dr. Spadafora, a revolu-
tionary, was an outspoken critic and bitter enemy of Noriega. 23 Days
14. Robinson, supra note 9, at 187.
15. The Noriega Connection, supra note 11.
16. See i.d In 1983, Bush, then CIA Director, met Noriega in Panama. A source present
at the meeting revealed that they discussed the Contra war. Noriega allegedly gave weapons
and money to Nicaraguan Contra leaders and allowed Contras to train in remote areas outside
United States bases. Id; see also Bruck, supra note 10, at 35.
17. See Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988).
The indictments alleged that Noriega provided sanctuary for members of the Medellin cartel
after the Colombian government's crackdown on drug traffickers, following the murder of
Colombian Minister of Justice, Rodriguez Lara-Bonilla. Id. For a thorough discussion of the
Medellin cartel's drug trafficking activities, see Comment, International Extradition and the
Medellih Cocaine Cartels: Surgical Removal of Colombian Cocaine Traffickers for Trial in the
United States, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 955 (1991).
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 400; see also Robinson, supra note 9, at 188.
19. Robinson, supra note 9, at 188. Arias had been involved in Panamanian politics since
1941. Id.; see also Bruck, supra note 10, at 38.
20. In October 1984, Ardito Barletta was sworn in as Panama's President after a paper-
thin victory in elections allegedly rigged by the opposition. L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at 4, col.
1.
21. On September 28, 1985, Ardito Barletta resigned after less than one year in office.
Panama's Military Chooses A New Softer-Line President, Financial Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at 4.
22. Politics: Spadafora Scandal Seen as Trigger- Was Ardito Barletta's Removal a Bid to
Deflect Attention, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., October 4, 1985.
23. Id.
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after contacting the DEA, Spadafora was found grotesquely tortured
and beheaded. 24 Rumors spread that the PDF murdered Spadafora
on Noriega's order.25 Weeks later, Barletta ordered an investigation
into Spadafora's death. Shortly thereafter, Barletta resigned his presi-
dency, allegedly succombing to pressure exerted by Noriega.
26
By 1985, Noriega was becoming an embarrassment to Washing-
ton, despite his value as an intelligence asset. 27 The Reagan adminis-
tration attempted to distance itself from Noriega 28 when it became
clear that he was involved in narcotics transportation through Pan-
ama.29 Noriega's power began to crumble in 1987. Colonel Roberto
Diaz Herrera, the retiring second-in-command of the PDF, publicly
accused Noriega of drug-related activities, rigging the 1984 election,
and murdering Hugo Spadafora. 30 Finally, evidence of Noriega's
drug trafficking activities resulted in grand jury indictments in Miami
and Tampa, on February 4, 1988. 31
Panama's political turmoil escalated in 1988 when President Eric
Delvalle announced that he had fired Noriega as chief of the PDF.32
However, Delvalle's choice to replace Noriega refused to take office,




27. See generally Situation in Panama: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-43 (1986) (statement
by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliot Abrams). Before the
investigations that led to the indictments in Miami and Tampa, the Reagan administration and
Congress had become concerned about the deteriorating political and human rights conditions
in Panama. This concern was directed not only toward the dominant role of the PDF in
Panamanian government operations, but also toward their use of excessive measures in quel-
ling demonstrations, widespread corruption, and their intimidation of political opponents, in-
cluding their alleged complicity in the unsolved murder of Dr. Hugo Spadafora. Id.
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
29. Some argue that the United States government suspected General Noriega's ties to
drug trafficking as far back as 1972, but that the United States believed Noriega's position and
knowledge outweighed the harm caused by his involvement in illegal narcotics trade. See, eg.,
US. Aides in '72 Weighed Killing Officer Who Now Leads Panama, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986,
at Al, col. 5 (city ed.). "Law enforcement officials in the Nixon Administration once proposed
the assassination of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, who was then chief of intelligence of the
Panama Defense Force, as partial solution to that nation's heavy drug trafficking .... " Id.
30. See Arias Calderon, supra note 12, at 329.
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
32. Milloy, Noriega to be Slippery Legally Too: Former Leader Claims He is a Political
Prisoner, Newsday, Jan. 5, 1990, at 2 (city ed.). Noriega had originally chosen Delvalle to be
President. Id.
33. Id.
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Assembly then ousted Delvalle and named Panama's Education Min-
ister, Manuel Solio Palma, as the minister in charge of the presi-
dency.34 Noriega's opposition retaliated by calling a general strike, in
February 1988. 35 In March, thousands marched in Panama City de-
manding free elections and an end to the alleged human rights abuses
of the Noriega regime.36 On March 16, a few PDF officers tried to
oust Noriega in an attempted coup d'etat.
3 7
In March and April 1988, the Reagan administration expanded
economic sanctions against Panama and blocked the withdrawal of
Panamanian funds from United States banks, in an effort to force
Noriega to relinquish his power. 38 Further, the United States even
tried to negotiate a deal with Noriega, whereby the indictments would
be dropped if Noriega would leave Panama.
39
On May 7, 1989, Panama's presidential election pitted Noriega's
candidate, Carlos Duque, against opposition candidate, Guillermo
Endara. When the polls closed, both sides claimed victory.4° On
May 10, 1989, the Panamanian government nullified the elections.
41
Because of the increasing civil unrest and bloodshed following the
election, President Bush ordered 2,000 additional United States mili-
tary troops to Panama.42 On September 1, 1989, provisional Presi-
dent Francisco Rodriguez took office;43 however, Noriega retained de





38. See Liech, Recognition of Governments, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 566, 571-74 (1988). On
April 8, 1988, President Reagan imposed economic sanctions, including the taking of assets,
against the Noriega regime in Panama. Id.; see generally Note, The Survival of Noriega: Les-
sons From the U.S. Sanctions Against Panama, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 269-323 (1989).
39. US. Makes Offer to Noriega: Tells Panama Leader that, if He Leaves Charges will be
Dropped, Newsday, Feb. 18, 1988, at 7 (city ed.) ("the Reagan administration has offered to
seek a dismissal of indictments against Panama's military leader, Gen. Manuel Noriega, if he
and several top aides leave that country"); US. Official's Secret Visit to Panama Told: State
Department Offers Noriega Deal to Accept Asylum in Spain Without Worry of Extradition, L.A.
Times, Mar. 19, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2 ("two senior State Department officials made a secret
visit to Panama on Friday to offer military strongman Manuel A. Noriega a deal under which
he would step down and accept political asylum in Spain in exchange for assurances that he
would not be extradited to the United States").






On October 3, 1989, in a final internal power struggle, Major
Moises Giroldi, chief of Noriega's security company, seized the head-
quarters of the PDF.45 Noriega negotiated with his captors until his
loyalist units attacked and forced the rebels to surrender. 46 Noriega
executed ten rebels, including Major Giroldi, after they surrendered.
47
Ironically, the unsuccessful military coup foreshadowed Noriega's de-
mise and marked a fateful chapter in his quest to retain power.
B. The Indictments
On February 4, 1988, federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa
indicted Noriega. 48 The twelve-count Miami indictment charged
Noriega, as a "principal," 49 with violating the Travel Act,50 racketeer-
ing,51 and conspiring to import, distribute, and manufacture cocaine
for sale in the United States.52 Noriega allegedly exploited his official
position as the head of the intelligence branch of the Panamanian Na-
tional Guard, and then as commander-in-chief of the PDF. He re-
ceived payoffs for assisting and protecting international drug
traffickers and money laundering operations in Panama.
5 3
Specifically, the indictments alleged that Noriega protected co-
caine shipments travelling through Panama, from Colombia to the
United States. 54 Further, he allegedly arranged for the transshipment
and sale of ether and acetone to the Medellin cartel. The indictment
45. Rebels Held Noriega for Hours: General's Fate was Discussed with US. Officer During
Coup Attempt, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1989, at IA; Three Top Officers, Thirty-Five Others Arrested
in Panama Plot, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
46. Boudreaux & Freed, Noriega Will Face Charges in Ten Deaths, L.A. Times, Jan. 1,
1990, at A l, col. 6.
47. Id.
48. Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) reads: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commissions is punishable as a princi-
ple." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a). This section prohibits the interference of any commerce by rob-
bery, extortion, or threats of physical violence. A violation of this section is punishable by
fines up to $10,000, twenty years imprisonment, or both. Id.
51. Id. § 1962(c), (d). This section proscribes participation in, or conspiracy with regard
to, an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering. Id.
52. 21 U.S.C. § 963. This section proscribes conspiracy to manufacture cocaine, in-
tending that it be imported into the United States for sale. Id. Noriega was further charged
with distributing, aiding, and abetting the distribution of cocaine, intending that it be imported
into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959 and 18 U.S.C § 2. Indictment, United
States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988).
53. See Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988).
54. Id.
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also alleged that Noriega provided a refuge for the continued opera-
tions of the Medellin cartel after the Colombian government's crack-
down on drug traffickers, following the murder of the Colombian
Minister of Justice, Rodriguez Lara-Bonilla 5  The indictment fur-
ther charged Noriega with protecting a cocaine laboratory in Darien
Province, Panama, and facilitating the transfer of millions of dollars
in narcotics proceeds from the United States to Panamanian banks
5 6
According to the Miami indictments, Noriega also allegedly
traveled to Havana, Cuba and met with President Fidel Castro.
7
Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellin cartel
over Panama's seizure of a cocaine laboratory in the Darien Province
that Noriega had been paid to protect.58 All of these activities were
allegedly undertaken for Noriega's personal profit5 9 The three-count
Tampa indictment 6° charged Noriega with conspiring to import or
distribute one million pounds of marijuana for sale in the United
States, between 1982 and 1984.61
On March 28, 1988, Noriega's counsel filed a motion in the
United States District Court in Miami, requesting a special appear-
ance to contest the jurisdiction of the court and to attack the legal
sufficiency of the indictments.62 The court granted the motion,
notwithstanding the fact that Noriega was a fugitive and not before





59. See US. Depicts Noriega as Drug Cartel Partner, Chic. Trib., Feb. 6, 1988, at 6.
60. Indictment, United States v. Noriega, No. 88-28 (M.D. Fla. fied Feb. 4, 1988).
61. Id. The Miami indictment also alleged that General Noriega participated in an un-
lawful racketeering enterprise, utilizing his official position to "facilitate the manufacture and
transportation of large quantities of cocaine destined for the United States and to launder
narcotics proceeds." Id.; see generally Noriega Indicted by U.S. for Links to Illegal Drugs,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
62. See Motion to Allow Special Appearance of Counsel, United States v. Noriega, 88-
0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 28, 1988). Noriega contested the court's jurisdiction to decide his
motion to allow special appearance of counsel, despite the fact that he was a fugitive. For case
law supporting this argument see United States v. Shapiro, 391 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
63. The court reasoned that, because this was the first indictment of the head of a foreign
state for using his position to commit the alleged crimes, its importance warranted a determi-
nation of the validity of the proceedings. United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373, 1374-75
(S.D. Fla. 1988). Judge Hoeveler stated:
The present indictment is surrounded with special circumstances which militate in
favor of allowing the defendant to attack its validity. Specifically, this appears to be a
case of first impression. Arguments of counsel will be helpful in resolving the deli-
cate issues presented. The case is fraught with political overtones. I do not propose
932 [Vol. 13:925
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likelihood that the Justice Department would seek extradition of
Noriega. 64 Further, the court did not expect that Noriega would ever
be brought to the United States to answer the charges against him.65
Ironically, subsequent events proved the court wrong.
C Apprehension of General Noriega
In the time between Noriega's indictment and his subsequent
capture, relations between the United States and Panama deteriorated
considerably. On December 15, 1989, Noriega's military dictatorship
announced it was in a state of war with the United States" and pub-
licly threatened the lives of United States citizens in Panama.
67
On December 20, 1989, President Bush announced to the nation
that he had ordered 26,000 military troops to Panama.68 President
Bush outlined four principle objectives justifying the commitment of
armed forces in Panama: 1) to protect American lives; 2) to assist the
lawful and democratically-elected government in Panama in fulfilling
its international obligations; 3) to defend the integrity of United States
rights under the Panama Canal treaties; and 4) to seize and arrest
General Noriega to face federal drug trafficking charges. 69
On the same day, the President issued two key memoranda, the
first ending economic sanctions against Panama,70 the second di-
recting the military to apprehend Noriega and other fugitives indicted
for drug-related offenses in the United States. 71 Before United States
troops were engaged, however, the Panamanian government swore in
to engage in any political inquiries beyond those properly raised by legal argument.
However, the best way to avoid the appearance that this indictment has assumed the
charter of a political proceeding, rather than a legal one, is to determine its legal
validity upon the arguments of counsel. In that way, the integrity of our legal system
will best be served.
Id.
64. Id. at 1373 n.l.
65. Id. at 1373.
66. Nanda, supra note 3, at 496. On December 15, 1989, the Panamanian legislature
adopted a resolution formally declaring the country to be in a state of war with the United
States. Id.
67. The most serious and repeatedly cited incident, allegedly precipitating the invasion,
occurred on December 15, 1989 when members of the PDF killed one United States Marine
officer, wounded another, beat a third, and threatened his wife at a roadblock. Protection of
Nationals-Deployment of US. Forces to Panama, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1990) [hereinafter
Protection of Nationals].
68. Address to the Nation, supra note 3.
69. Id.; see Nanda, supra note 3, at 494.
70. Memorandum Directing the Lifting of Economic Sanctions on Panama, 25 WEEKLY
COMp. PREs. Doc. 1977 (Dec. 20, 1989); see Protection of Nationals, supra note 67, at 549.
71. Memorandum Directing Apprehension, supra note 4.
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Guillermo Endara as president, and he, in turn, welcomed the assist-
ance of United States armed forces.72 President Endara reportedly
won the Panamanian presidential election, which Noriega had nulli-
fied several months earlier.73
Noriega eluded capture during the initial military assault.74 He
requested asylum in the Papal Nunciate at Panama City on Christmas
Eve, 1989. 75 Panamanian Archbishop Jose Sebastian Laboa, the Vati-
can nuncio in Panama since 1982, agreed to provide temporary refuge
to Noriega while the Vatican determined whether he should be prose-
cuted for criminal or political activity. 76 In the next ten days, the
Vatican, the newly installed Panamanian government of President
Guillermo Endara, and the Bush administration held intensive negoti-
ations for Noriega's surrender. 77
On January 3, 1990, Noriega voluntarily left the Vatican em-
bassy and submitted to the custody of General Maxwell Thurman,
Chief of the United States Army's Southern Command.78 Noriega
was flown by helicopter to Howard Air Force Base in Panama where
DEA agents arrested him.79 The United States then transported
Noriega to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.80 Finally, on January
4, 1990, Noriega was arraigned in the United States District Court in
Miami, on charges stemming from his indictment for drug trafficking.
On February 8, 1990, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction over
Noriega.8s
72. Protection of Nationals, supra note 67, at 549.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
74. Fearful that Noriega might escape to Mexico or another country, the Bush adminis-
tration offered a $1 million bounty for his capture. DeStefano, Noriega Bounty Backed by U.S.
Drug Charges, Newsday, Dec. 22, 1989, at 5 (city ed.). "It's legal for the United States to offer
a $I million bounty for Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega because he is a suspected
narcotics trafficker .... " Id.
75. Vatican Refuses to Turn Noriega over to US., L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1989, at Al,
col. 6.
76. Noriega Seeks Asylum with Pope's Envoy in Panama, Reuters, Dec. 24, 1989;
Noriega's Fate Uncertain Now that He Seeks Vatican Asylum, Reuters, Dec. 25, 1989; Noriega's
Case Hands Vatican Delicate Diplomatic Dilemma, Reuters, Dec. 25, 1989.
77. Boudreaux & Freed, supra note 46, at AI. Panama's top legal officer, Attorney Gen-
eral Rogelio Cruz, and President Guillermo Endara disagreed as to whether Noriega should be
extradited to the United States or stand trial in Panama. Harris, Panama Gives Conflicting
Signals on Noriega's Fate, Reuters, Jan. 1, 1990.
78. Tweedale, supra note 6.
79. Id.
80. Noriega Surrenders to US.: He Leaves Embassy and is Flown to Florida for Trial,
L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at Al, col. 5; The Surrender of Noriega: Text of President's Statement
on Noriega, L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
81. Judge Won't Yield to Jurisdiction, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at P2, col. 3.
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III. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
THE INVASION OF PANAMA.
Many people criticized the United States' activities in Panama.
On December 29, 1989, nine days after Operation Just Cause began,
the United Nations General Assembly condemned the invasion as a
violation of international law.82 Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter unequivocally prohibits "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions."' 83 Similar proscriptions against the use of force are found in
multilateral regional conventions. For example, article 1 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ("Rio Treaty") strongly
condemns war and the threat or use of force "in any manner inconsis-
tent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or the
treaty."
84
Furthermore, article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of the
American States ("O.A.S.") prohibits any military occupation, even
temporary, or "other measures of force taken by another State, di-
rectly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."8 5 It further provides
that "[n]o territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either
by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized. ' 86
Despite the United Nations' condemnation, the Bush administra-
tion justified the invasion as an exercise of the right of self-defense
under international law.87 The following analysis addresses whether
the stated purposes of the United States intervention in Panama fall
82. Effects of the Military Intervention by the United States of America in Panama on the
Situation in Central America, G.A. Res. 240, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49), U.N. Doc. A/
Res/44/240 (1989). By a vote of 75 to 20, with 40 abstentions, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted a resolution strongly condemning the United States military intervention in
Panama as a flagrant violation of international law. The resolution also demanded the imme-
diate withdrawal of United States forces, as mandated by the principles of neutrality, set forth
in the Panama Canal treaties. Id.; UN. General Assembly Deplores US: Action in Panama,
Reuters, Dec. 29, 1989; UN. Condemns US. Military Action in Panama, United Press Int'l,
Dec. 29, 1989.
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
84. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. I, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77. Both the United States and Panama are signatories to the
treaty. Id.
85. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 17.
86. Id. art. 21.
87. Address to the Nation, supra note 3, at 1974; Fighting in Panama: The State Dept.-
Excerpts from Statement by Baker on US. Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, § A, at 19, col.
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within any of the exceptions to article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter, article 21 of the O.A.S. Charter, or principles of customary inter-
national law.8
A. Safeguarding the Lives of United States Citizens
Safeguarding the lives of United States citizens was the first of
the four United States justifications for invading Panama.8 9 The
United States claimed to have exercised its inherent right of self-de-
fense, as recognized in the United Nations and O.A.S. Charters.9°
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides that "[n]othing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security." 91 Article 18
of the O.A.S. Charter provides: "The American States bind them-
selves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of
force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with existing
treaties or in fulfillment thereof. ' 92 Under these articles, the United
States claimed the right to take measures necessary to defend United
States citizens, military personnel, and both military and civilian in-
stallations in Panama. According to the United States government,
the operation sought to protect United States lives, given "General
Noriega's reckless threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama
"93
Regardless of what the United States government stated publicly,
the incidents triggering the United States invasion of Panama do not
88. Customary international law refers to the general practice of governments which is
widely accepted as law. F. NEWMAN & D. WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 594-96 (1990); 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TiONS § 102 comment b (1987) ("there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a
practice must be, but it should reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved
in the relevant activity"). A customary norm binds all governments, including those that have
not recognized it, so long as they have not expressly and persistently objected to its develop-
ment. Id. comment d.
In Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, the International Court of Justice held that, in spite of the United States' invocation
of the United Nations Charter as a basis for resolving disputes, "customary international law
continues to exist and to apply, separately from international treaty law, even where the two
categories of law have an identical content." Id.
89. See Address to Nation, supra note 3, at 1974.
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; O.A.S. CHARTER art. 18.
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
92. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 18.
93. Address to the Nation, supra note 3, at 1974.
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rise to the level of an "armed attack," as contemplated by the O.A.S.
Charter. Three incidents on December 15, 1989 supposedly precipi-
tated the invasion. Members of the PDF killed one United States
Marine officer at a roadblock, wounded another, and beat a third
while threatening his wife with sexual abuse.94 While these incidents
were serious, they did not constitute a systematic or continuous pat-
tern of aggression that would evidence the preparation of an "armed
attack" against the United States.
In the week preceding the armed invasion, the Panamanian As-
sembly adopted a formal resolution declaring a state of war with the
United States.95 While the outbreak of war may accompany a decla-
ration of war,96 no evidence exists to demonstrate that Panama was
indeed poised for war against the United States. In addition, Panama
did not instigate an "armed attack" against the United States. Dep-
uty Secretary of State Eagleburger called Panama's declaration of war
a "charade and nonsense."' 97 Indeed, the Bush administration did not
seem to take these measures seriously, describing the Assembly's ac-
tion as "another hollow step in an attempt to force [Noriega's] rule on
the Panamanian people." 98
Even assuming that the Bush administration ordered the inva-
sion in anticipation of an armed attack by Noriega's forces, such "an-
ticipatory self-defense" can only be justified in extreme cases. 99
Historically, the United Nations has not authorized "anticipatory
94. Nanda, supra note 3, at 496.
95. Id.
96. Article I of the Hague Convention of 1906 provides that "[t]he Contracting Powers
recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and ex-
plicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with
conditional declaration of war." Hague Convention No. III, 36 Stat. 2259, T.I.A.S. No. 538,
205 Parry's T.S. 263.
97. Noriega Gets New Powers, Title in Panama, Chi. Trib., Dec. 16, 1989, at 8C.
98. Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega, N.Y. Times, Dec.
17, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
99. " 'Anticipatory self-defense' [is] the right to act in self-defense in anticipation of at-
tack." Henkin, Force Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, AM.
SOC. INT'L L. 147, 150 (1963). Traditional international law permits the use of armed force in
anticipation of an attack whenever there exists a "necessity of self-defense" which is imminent,
overwhelming, and leaves no time for deliberation. Zebalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some
Unresolved Questions Involving the Law ofAnticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 129 (1987). For specific applications of the doctrine, see Polebaum, National Self-Defense in
International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 187, 190,
195, 200, 212, 223, 225, 226 (1984) (examination of the June 7, 1981 Israeli aerial attack
against the Tamuz I nuclear reactor in Baghdad, Iraq); Joyner, The United States Action in
Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 133, 134, 140
(1984).
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self-defense."l °0 In this case, there existed no evidence that the
United States was threatened with an imminent Panamanian armed
attack. Thus, the invasion cannot be justified as preventive war.
Moreover, the Preamble to the Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
("Declaration") imposes a duty on states to refrain from acts of repri-
sal involving the use of force.101 However, the Declaration, in its
General Part, also states that nothing therein "shall be construed as
prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the Charter or the rights
and duties of Member States under the Charter .... ,,io2 Debate con-
tinues over the proper application of article 2(4),1o3 whether states
may resort to reprisals104 under the rubric of article 51, and the inher-
ent right of self-defense. 10 5
Nevertheless, the use of force under the "self-defense" exception
of article 51 can be justified only where: 1) the intervention is tempo-
rary and limited in scope; 106 2) it is a last resort; 10 7 3) it is neces-
100. The United Nations rejected attempts to read the United Nations Charter as permit-
ting anticipatory self-defense, in relation to Suez and Sinai. Henkin, supra note 99, at 151.
101. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 337, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
This appears to clarify article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. See supra text accompany-
ing note 83.
102. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 340, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
103. See generally Comment, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article
2(4), 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984) (hereinafter Comment, Coercion and Self-Determination];
Comment, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984) [hereinafter
Comment, Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion].
104. Reprisals are retaliatory acts which would otherwise be unlawful, but are permitted
in warfare to force an adversary to comply with the laws of war. DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 497 (1956).
105. It has been argued that Article 51 was not intended to be a comprehensive state-
ment (or restatement) of the law of self-defense, that it was hastily drafted... at the
San Francisco conference as part of the compromise that brought the Latin Ameri-
can States into the organization by preserving, in part, their preference for regional
arrangements.
J. SWEENY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM CASES AND
MATERIALS 1462 (3d ed. 1987).
106. Humanitarian intervention involves one government using physical force to stop an-
other government from engaging in human rights violations. F. NEWMAN & D. WEISSBRODT,
supra note 88, at 545. There are generally six criteria for judging the legality of humanitarian
intervention:
(1) There must be an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental human rights.
(2) All other remedies for the protection of those rights have been exhausted to the
extent possible within the time constraints posed by the threat.
(3) An attempt has been made to secure the approval of appropriate authorities in the
target state.
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sary; 0 8 and 4) it is proportional to the threat to the lives of United
States citizens. 1° 9 These requirements are subject to United Nations
review.
Arguably, the invasion and occupation of Panama was tempo-
rary. Further, given the United States' frustrated efforts to topple
Noriega, the extralegal methods employed could be considered a last
resort. The use of a large scale military operation, however, was un-
necessary to protect the lives of United States citizens. It also was
clearly not in proportion to the threat of Panamanian aggression
against United States citizens. The United States carried out the in-
vasion with over 25,000 troops armed with the world's most sophisti-
cated and powerful weapons."l 0 The United States employed tanks,
bazookas, mortar artillery, M-60 machine guns, M- 113 armored per-
sonnel carriers, AC- 130 Spectre gunships, and even Stealth F- 117
fighter bombers in this attack.I' According to the Independent Com-
mission of Inquiry on the United States invasion of Panama, the inva-
sion resulted in 3,000 to 4,000 deaths-mostly civilians."12  In
addition, the invasion caused severe, widespread devastation and de-
(4) There is a minimal effect on the extant structure of authority (e.g., that the inter-
vention not be used to impose or preserve a preferred regime).
(5) The intervention must be of limited duration.
(6) A report of the intervention must be filed immediately with the Security Council
and, where relevant, regional organizations.
Lillich, A United States Policy of Humanitarian Intervention and Intercession, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 278, 287-90 (D. Kommers & G. Loescher ed.
1979) [hereinafter Lillich, U.S. Policy of Humanitarian Intervention and Intercession]; Lillich,
Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 347-51 (1967);
Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 261-64
(1969); Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis" Impact on World Or-
der, Part 1, 43 DEN. L.J. 439, 474-79 (Fall 1966).
107. See sources cited supra note 106.
108. The requirement of "necessity" applies when a nation engages in military action to
defend its interests. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1635-37 (1984) (hereinafter Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force]; see also
Schachter, Self-Help in International Law: U.S. Action in the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 37 J.
INT'L AFF. 231 (Winter 1984) (discussing the 1980 attack on the United States Embassy in
Tehran and whether the seizure of hostages constituted an armed attack).
109. "Proportionality is closely linked to necessity as a requirement of self-defense."
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 108, at 1637-38. The idea is
that the amount of force used must be in proportion to the aggression. Id.; see also Robblee,
The Legitimacy of Modern Conventional Weaponry, 71 MIL. L. REV. 95, 111 (1976) (humani-
tarian considerations require that belligerents shall not inflict on their adversaries harm out of
proportion to the object of warfare, to destroy or weaken the military strength of the enemy).
110. Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 1, United States v. Noriega, 88-0079 (S.D. Fla.
1988) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
111. Id.
112. The Independent Commission of Inquiry on the United States Invasion of Panama
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struction to both humans and property. One official estimate states
that at least 18,000 civilian homes were destroyed during the inva-
sion.1 13 Human rights groups estimated that the number of displaced
civilians exceeded 50,000. 114
Humanitarian considerations and principles of the law of war re-
quire that belligerents not inflict harm on their adversaries out of pro-
portion to the object of warfare. 1' 5 Even assuming that one can
justify some level of intervention to protect United States nationals,
the scale of the operation casts serious doubt on whether the United
States' actions satisfied the minimum required standards of necessity
and proportionality under customary international law. It is equally
doubtful that this qualifies as an exception to the limitation on the use
of force under article 51 of the O.A.S. Charter.
B. Restoration of Democracy
The second objective of Operation Just Cause was the return to
power of Panama's lawful and democratically-elected government
and the fulfillment of Panama's obligations under international law." 1
6
Panama's obligations include a duty, under the Single Convention on
Narcotics Drugs, to prevent the use of its territory as a base for smug-
gling drugs into the United States. 117 General Noriega assumed
power through coercion and scare tactics, against the will of the Pana-
manian people. Noriega's nullification of the May 1989 presidential
election is a prime example of his tactics."18 Thus, the United States
argued that Noriega was preventing the lawful government of Pan-
ama from keeping its international obligations.
Even though Noriega gained power through intimidation and co-
ercion, there is no legal basis for forcibly invading a sovereign country
to replace dictatorial rule with democracy. The strong language in
article 15 of the O.A.S. Charter prohibits the use of force in another
state's territory. Specifically, it states that no state shall "intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or ex-
prepared a report ("IC Report") on the invasion of Panama, on February 8, 1990. Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 110, at 2 n. 1.
113. The Physicians for Human Rights prepared a report ("PHR Report") on March 15,
1990. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 110, at 3.
114. Id.
115. Robblee, supra note 109, at 111.
116. Address to the Nation, supra note 3; Nanda, supra note 3, at 498.
117. Panama is a signatory to the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961,
18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 500 U.N.T.S. 1407.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
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ternal affairs of any other State." 119 This prohibition covers not only
the use of armed force, but also "any other form of interference or
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic, and cultural elements."' 20
In addition, the United Nations General Assembly has recog-
nized the principle of nonintervention, in the Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States. 12 1 The International Court of Justice
also recognizes nonintervention as an operative principle of custom-
ary international law. 122 The court recently reiterated its rejection of
military intervention in foreign nations, based on international law
and public policy.123
The Panamanians' rights to self-determination, freedom, and in-
dependence from Noriega's dictatorial rule is universally recog-
nized. 124 However, the right of Panamanians to foreign assistance or
support constituting intervention is not universally recognized. 25
119. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 15.
120. Id.
121. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 337, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
122. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Judgment of Apr. 9, 1949).
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a
policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as
cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in
international law.... (F]rom the nature of things, [intervention] would be reserved
for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration
of international justice itself.
Id.
123. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, paras. 205, 258, 263 (Judgment of June 27). For discussion of Nicar. v. US., see
generally Gordon, The Nicaraguan Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-
Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135 (1987).
124. The General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations provides:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine,
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, so-
cial and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 339, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1920).
125. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter does not allow powerful states to over-
throw governments allegedly unresponsive to the popular will. "That invasions may at times
serve democratic values must be weighed against the dangerous consequences of legitimizing
armed attacks against peaceful governments." Comment, The Legality of Pro-Democratic In-
vasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 649 (1984). There is little agreement as to the legality of
humanitarian intervention. See F. BOYLE, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1989); Lillich, U.S. Policy of Humanitarian Intervention and
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Nor is there any international legal instrument which permits a for-
eign intervenor to maintain or impose a democratic form of govern-
ment in another state.' 2 6 Though it is lawful for a foreign state to
offer moral, political, and humanitarian assistance to politically op-
pressed peoples, it is unlawful for a foreign state to intervene in that
struggle, provide arms and supplies, or provide other logistical sup-
port. 27 Moreover, humanitarians certainly do not advocate a unilat-
eral military invasion that results in severe and widespread human
devastation, dislocation, and property damage.
128
Panama and the United States coexist in an international frame-
work where legal and moral principles are developed based on
reciprocity 2 9 and comity.130 Disagreements are resolved through dia-
logue, negotiations, and the application of consensual customary
norms and principles.' 31 When consensus is not obtained, equal par-
ticipants are obliged to comply with principles of international law.'
32
Removing Noriega from power and restoring to the Panamanian
people the right to democratic control over their country may be
Intercession, supra note 106, at 287-90; F. TEsoN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988).
126. All nations have recognized that "intervention" is unlawful. Henkin, supra note 99,
at 154-59. Article 1(7) of the United Nations Charter enjoins the United Nations itself from
intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 7. Article 2(4), which applies to member states, prohibits "the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state."
Id. art. 2, para. 4.
127. There is on-going debate as to the scope of humanitarian aid and whether nations
may give military and political support to assist the liberation movements. Henkin, supra note
99, at 154-59; Comment, Coercion and Self-Determination, supra note 103, at 643; Comment,
Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, supra note 103, at 649.
128. The purpose of humanitarian intervention is to safeguard fundamental human rights.
F. NEWMAN & D. WEISSBRODT, supra note 88, at 545. One of the major criteria in determin-
ing the validity of humanitarian intervention is whether the intervenor employs the minimal
requisite force and whether the intervention is not likely to cause greater injury to innocent
persons and their property than would result if the threatened violation actually occurred. See
supra text accompanying notes 106-109. The invasion of Panama clearly exceeded the parame-
ters justifying a legitimate humanitarian intervention.
129. Reciprocity is fundamental to international law. The doctrine of reciprocity defines
"the relations existing between two states when each of them gives the subjects of the other
certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects shall enjoy similar privileges at the hands
of the latter state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (5th ed. 1979).
130. Comity of nations refers to "the recognition which one nation allows within its terri-
tory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws." Id at 242.
131. See generally Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 108.
132. Id.
Noriega's Abduction
laudable. However, removing a tyrant from power cannot justify the
violent means employed by the United States. The United States vio-
lated the well-established international legal principle of noninterven-
tion in the internal affairs of other countries. Some authors argue that
article 2(4) should be interpreted to allow external interference to es-
tablish democracy. 133 However, using an expansive interpretation of
article 2(4) to topple a repressive regime violates the plain language of
the United Nations, O.A.S., and other regional charters.
By advocating the violent overthrow of another government and
forcibly removing its leader, the United States risks serious repercus-
sions. The United States' actions validate similar actions by other
governments for political and ideological purposes. This ad hoc pol-
icy threatens to destroy international comity. 34 Furthermore, the
United States has lost its credibility by failing to adhere to the princi-
ples of reciprocity and international law.
The long-term economic and political effects on Panama as a re-
sult of the invasion are far-reaching. The United States invasion seri-
ously damaged Panama's economy. 35 Many homes and businesses
were looted in its aftermath.1 36 The United States will have to pro-
vide substantial financial and humanitarian aid to rebuild Panama's
economy. 37 Additionally, political instability in Panama will likely
continue for some time, while the new Endara government rebuilds
Panama's political system.
C. Integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties
In response to Noriega's aggression and declaration of war
against the United States, President Bush claimed to be exercising the
133. See D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 516 (1990); Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 503,
505 (1990).
Jeane Kirkpatrick, former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, advocated
an expansive interpretation of article 2(4), regarding the United States' invasion of Grenada.
She stated that the language in article 2(4) provides "ample justification for the use of fore ...
in pursuit of the other values also inscribed in the charter-freedom, democracy, peace." 83
DEP'T ST. BULL. (No. 2081), at 74 (1983).
134. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. Ross, U.S. Lawmakers See Big Challenge in Rebuilding, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at
5A, col. 2.
136. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 110, at 3.
137. Id.; Ross, supra note 135, at 5A, col. 2; Giacomo, Panama Can Count on U.S Sup-
port for Economy--Eagleburger, Reuters, Jan. 2, 1990.
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United States' right and obligation under the Panama Canal Treaty 138
and the Neutrality Treaty 39 to protect and defend the canal and its
availability to all countries. 140
The Neutrality Treaty declares that the canal shall be perma-
nently neutral.141 Upon ratifying the treaty, the United States Senate
concluded that the Canal must remain neutral except to defend
against "any threat to the regime of neutrality," or the "peaceful
transit of vessels through the Canal."' 42 The right to defend the Ca-
nal, however, does not extend to interference with the "territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of Panama."'
43
This justification for the United States invasion fails to meet the
stringent exceptions in the Canal and Neutrality Treaties. Noriega's
declaration of war did not affect the Canal's operation. Nothing re-
stricted Canal access nor curtailed regular commerce in the weeks
preceding the invasion. In sum, the Canal was not threatened with
destruction such that it required force to defend it.
D. Apprehending Noriega
The United States' final justification for the invasion was the
arrest of Noriega and others in Panama subject to United States in-
dictment for drug-related offenses. I" President Bush issued a Memo-
138. Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. 39, T.I.A.S.
No. 10030.
139. Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,
Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 10029 [hereinafter Neutrality
Treaty].
140. See generally The Panama Canal Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-70, 93 Stat. 452 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). The allocation of the authority and re-
sponsibility to defend the canal, an aspect not clearly provided for in either of the two treaties,
continues to be debated. See, e.g., Maier, The Right to Defend the Panama Canal, 13 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 218 (1983); Maier, United States Defense Rights in the Panama Canal
Treaties.: The Need for Clarification of a Studied Ambiguity, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1984).
141. Neutrality Treaty, supra note 139, art. I, 33 U.S.T. at 11.
142. Id. at 3 (proclamation by President Carter).
143. This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as, a right of intervention of the
United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any United States action will be
directed at insuring that the Canal will remain open, secure, and accessible, and it
shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of
Panama.
Id. at 4 (proclamation by President Carter).
144. The United States arrested five co-defendants named along with General Noriega in
the indictments. One arrestee was Lieutenant Colonel Del Cid, a commander in the Panama-
nian Defense Forces in Chiriqui Province. He was transported to Miami to face charges for
being a liaison and courier between drug traffickers and Noriega. United States v. Noriega, 88-
0079 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988). Del Cid pleaded not guilty and challenged the court's
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randum to the Secretary of Defense authorizing the use of the United
States armed forces to apprehend and, if necessary, arrest the fugi-
tives. 1 45 Any persons apprehended were to be turned over to United
States law enforcement officials as soon as possible. 146
The Miami and Tampa grand juries inaccurately based the in-
dictments on the "protective principle." This principle allows the
United States to prosecute illegal acts committed by aliens outside its
territorial borders if, and only if, those acts are threats to the security
of the United States or interfere with governmental operations.1 47
Courts have recently applied this principle in drug cases.1 48 Before
jurisdiction. Milloy, supra note 32, at 3. Another co-defendant, Daniel Miranda, accused of
flying $800,000 in drug profits from Florida to Panama in 1983, was arrested in Panama.
Miranda challenged the legitimacy of his indictment by refusing to answer charges against
him. A not guilty plea was entered for him. Id. Eduardo Pardo, a pilot, arrested in Panama
and flown to Florida, was arraigned with Noriega. According to the indictment, Pardo flew
the plane with Miranda. Id. William Saldarriaga and Brian Davidow, reputed Columbian
drug traffickers, are being held without bail. Id.
145. See supra text accompanying note 4.
146. Memorandum Directing Apprehension, supra note 4.
In the course of carrying out the military operation in Panama which I have directed,
I hereby direct and authorize the units and members of the Armed Forces of the
United States to apprehend General Manuel Noriega and any other persons in Pan-
ama currently under indictment in the United States for drug-related offenses. I fur-
ther direct that any persons apprehended pursuant to this directive are to be turned
over to civil law enforcement officials of the United States as soon as practicable. I
also authorize and direct members of the Armed Forces of the United States to de-
tain and arrest any persons apprehended pursuant to this directive if, in their judg-
ment, such action is necessary.
Id.
147. The "protective principle" provides that a sovereign has jurisdiction to prosecute
those who commit acts outside of its territory which have potentially adverse effects on its
security or governmental functions, even though no criminal effects actually occur within the
state. Note, Drug Smuggling and the Protective Principle: A Journey into Unchartered Waters,
39 LA. L. REv. 1189, 1190 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 402(l)(c).
148. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) ("the protec-
tive principle allows nations to assert jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas that
threaten their [national] security or governmental functions"); United States v. Newball, 524
F. Supp. 715, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("drug smuggling threatens the security and sovereignty to
the United States by affecting its armed forces, contributing to widespread crime, and circum-
venting federal customs laws"); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("the unlawful import of drugs bypasses the federal customs laws, and thus directly
challenges a governmental function ... [a]ccordingly, the protective principle supports asser-
tion of jurisdiction in this case"); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978)
(holding that a planned invasion of United States territory by marijuana smugglers had a po-
tentially adverse effect on security and government functions in the enforcement of laws
prohibiting the importation of controlled substances); Chelburg, The Contours of Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction in Drug Smuggling Cases, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 43 (1983); Note,
supra note 147.
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the United States' invasion of Panama, the Bush administration ap-
proved the Justice Department's new policy for abducting illegal drug
traffickers abroad, pursuant to this "protective principle." This policy
allows enforcement agents to seize fugitives overseas without the per-
mission of the government of the country from which the individual is
to be captured.
149
The United States asserts that, under the protective principle, it
has the authority to proscribe extraterritorial acts threatening United
States national security.150 However, a full-scale military invasion of
another country, for the express purpose of arresting a single person,
is unprecedented. The United States' authority to punish criminal ac-
tivities by foreign nationals does not validate an invasion to abduct an
individual to face criminal charges in the United States. 15' The
United States must work within the international framework of coop-
eration and mutual respect, and is subject to the principles of interna-
tional treaties and customary norms. Illegal means should not be
countenanced to accomplish even laudable goals.
1. Extradition Law and the Noriega Case
Extradition is the process whereby one sovereign surrenders a
person, sought as an accused criminal or fugitive, to another sover-
eign. 152 This is done most often pursuant to a bilateral pact or
treaty.1 53 The United States usually relies on bilateral treaties for ex-
tradition, but a multilateral treaty is equally valid. 154 The United
States binds itself to only those extradition treaties or agreements it
chooses. 155 Further, it considers the process and practice of extradi-
tion subject to federal legislation. 156 As a result, the United States
149. In June 1989, Assistant Attorney General William Barr drafted a 28-page opinion
supporting the United States' actions, stating that the FBI has authority to seize fugitives
overseas without permission from foreign governments. Carlson, Legal Question About U.S.
Plan to Nab Noriega, S.F. Chron., Dec. 21, 1989, at A21.
150. See sources cited supra note 147.
151. The "protective principle" only confers the right to proscribe criminal acts. Note,
supra note 147, at 1190. Sovereigns must comply with the formal extradition process, or its
exceptions, to enforce or bring a fugitive to justice.
152. M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 5-9 (1987).
153. Id. at 39-40.
154. International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, 74
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 274, 277 (1980).
155. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 152, at 56.
156. For example, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407, 411 (1886), set forth the principle of exclusive reliance on bilateral extradition treaties by
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does not apply customary international law to extradition, except in-
sofar as it may apply to treaty interpretation.
Extraditable offenses are listed in the treaty and usually must be
crimes under the laws of both countries, punishable by a minimum
number of years. 15 7 Article II of the bilateral extradition treaty be-
tween Panama and the United States lists thirteen extraditable of-
fenses.5 8 Although drug trafficking is not listed as an extraditable
offense, a subsequent multilateral treaty to which Panama and the
United States are parties, the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs,
prohibits the parties from using their territories to smuggle drugs.
1 59
Despite the Single Convention, extradition of Noriega was sim-
ply not feasible. As the head of state and de facto ruler of Panama, he
could immunize himself from extradition. Although active discus-
sions and plans to oust Noriega began in 1986, the Bush administra-
tion initiated no formal extradition procedures. President Bush used
extralegal means in lieu of formal extradition, authorizing the military
invasion of Panama to abduct Noriega and other indicted
individuals. 60
The United States is abducting aliens, with increasing frequency,
to bring them to justice in the United States. In fact, it is estimated
that the United States abducts two individuals from Mexico alone
every day. 161 In addition, the judiciary, as well as the executive
branch, has authorized such abductions. 162 The well-established Ker-
Frisbie doctrine states that courts will not inquire into the methods by
which defendants are brought to trial. 63 Thus, the United States
the United States. Further, Rauscher firmly established that the various states have no power
to negotiate extradition treaties; international extradition is regarded as an exclusive national
power, and there can be no extradition under present practice without a treaty. Id. at 414.
157. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 152, at 615.
158. Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Panama Providing for the
Extradition of Criminals, May 25, 1904, United States-Panama, art. 5, 34 Stat. 2851, T.I.A.S.
No. 445. The offenses enumerated in the treaty include murder, arson, robbery, forgery, coun-
terfeiting, embezzlement by public officers, fraud, perjury, rape, willful destruction of rail-
roads, crimes committed at sea, piracy, revolt on the high sea, assault on board a ship on the
high sea, slavery and/or slave trading, and bribery. The extradition treaty does not include
any offenses relating to drug trafficking. Id.
159. Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No.
6298, 500 U.N.T.S. 1407.
160. Memorandum Directing Apprehension, supra note 4.
161. Moss, Official Kidnapping, 77 A.B.A. J. 24 (Jan. 1991).
162. Id.
163. The doctrine is a product of two landmark cases, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)
and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), which held that a court will not lose jurisdiction
over the defendant merely because he was apprehended illegally.
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courts assumed jurisdiction over Noriega, despite the fact he was ab-
ducted by military action.
2. Legal Limits to Unauthorized Abductions
Although United States courts routinely validate unlawful ab-
ductions, courts have recognized some limits to this activity.1 64 In
United States v. Toscanino,165 an Italian citizen alleged that he had
been kidnapped from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay, taken to
Brazil, and then to the United States to stand trial. According to
Toscanino, he and his pregnant wife were lured to a deserted area in
Montevideo by Uruguayan police officers, who were actually paid
agents of the United States.166 In full view of his wife, the agents
knocked Toscanino unconscious with a gun, bound and blindfolded
him, and threw him into the back seat of a car. 67 At one point, Tos-
canino's abductors placed a gun to his head to force him to lie quietly
as a Uruguayan military convoy passed by.' 68
Toscanino's abductors took him to Brasilia. Once there,
Brazilians, allegedly acting on behalf of United States agents, sub-
jected Toscanino to brutal torture and interrogation for seventeen
days. 69 Toscanino claimed that his captors denied him sleep and all
forms of nourishment for days at a time. 70 He was fed intravenously
in amounts barely sufficient to keep him alive.' 7' Toscanino's captors
forced him to walk up and down a hallway for seven or eight hours at
a time; when he fell, he was kicked and beaten. 72 To induce him to
respond to interrogation, the agents pinched Toscanino's fingers with
metal pliers, flushed alcohol into his eyes and nose, and forced fluids
into his anal passage. 73 Toscanino's captors also attached electrodes
to his earlobes, toes, and genitals, and then shot electricity throughout
164. Some courts have authorized government agents to be involved in illegal activities to
facilitate the capture of criminals, but they have also recognized limits to this activity. In
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973), the court stated that there should be a
limit to government involvement in crime. "Government 'investigation' involving participa-
tion in activities that result in injury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should
be extremely reluctant to sanction." Id. at 677.
165. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
166. Id. at 269.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 270.






his body, leaving him unconscious for lengthy periods of time. 74
The Second Circuit held that, if proved, such egregious conduct
would violate the defendant's due process rights. 75 In reaching its
conclusion, the Second Circuit considered the general Ker-Frisbie rule
that a court's jurisdiction over an accused is not impaired by the ille-
gal method the government uses to acquire control over him. 76 The
court emphasized, however, that the Ker and Frisbie decisions were
rendered at a time when due process was limited to the fairness of the
procedures at trial. 17 7 Since then, the Supreme Court has expanded
due process "to bar the government from realizing directly the fruits
of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the ac-
cused to trial."' 17
8
Applying the Toscanino standard to the Noriega case, the crucial
inquiry is whether the United States military invasion of Panama, car-
ried out to bring Noriega to trial in the United States, "offend[s] those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
. . . peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous of-
fenses."'' 79 The United States' conduct in invading Panama far ex-
ceeds anything previously considered by United States courts. The
invasion of Panama involved over 25,000 heavily armed United States
troops.1 0 Further, it caused excessive damage to the Panamanian na-
tion physically, economically, and politically.' 8 ' Such massive de-
struction of humanity and property by the United States to arrest one
person shocks the conscience and violates the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
However, Noriega does not have standing to assert the rights of
174. Id.
175. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the United
States Supreme Court discussed conduct giving rise to due process concerns. In that case, a
suspect swallowed two tablets as state police officers were placing him under arrest. The of-
ficers took him to a hospital where a doctor forced "an emetic solution through a tube into [the
defendant's] stomach against his will." Id. at 166. When the defendant vomited, the officers
recovered the capsules and subsequently introduced them into evidence against the defendant.
Holding such evidence inadmissible, Justice Frankfurter wrote that the inquiry is whether "the
whole course of proceedings [resulting in a conviction]... offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses." Id. at 169.
176. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 271.
177. Id. at 275.
178. Id. at 272.
179. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
180. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 110, at 3.
181. Id.
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the Panamanian people. Only injured individuals can raise due pro-
cess claims. 1 2 Moreover, if the judiciary divested itself of jurisdiction
over Noriega, under the outrageous conduct exception in Toscanino, a
serious separation of powers problem could develop.1 83 The judiciary
would be, in effect, condemning the actions of the executive, and en-
croaching into the realm of foreign policy. Thus, although the inva-
sion is probably conduct that shocks the conscience, it is likely to be
declared a non-justiciable political question.18
Assuming Noriega cannot successfully raise these constitutional
claims in United States courts, the United States is still bound by vari-
ous humanitarian conventions and treaties which accord protection to
individuals. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, guar-
antees to "all human beings" the right to a fair hearing, to be pre-
sumed innocent, to freedom of movement, and to asylum.1 85 In
particular, article 9 prohibits the "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile"
of an individual.
186
Another example is the Council of Europe, created in 1949,
which sought "a greater unity between its members for the purpose of
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their
common heritage."18 7 One major aim was to protect the fundamental
182. The doctrine of third-party standing is a Court-made exception to the general rule
that a defendant may not bring a legal claim if his own constitutional rights have not been
violated. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980).
183. Since the Supreme Court first claimed the power of judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803), courts have declared certain actions, properly
within the purview of the executive and legislative branches, to be beyond the scope of judicial
inquiry. The nonjusticiability of political questions is based on the recognition of the separa-
tion of powers and the system of checks and balances provided for in the Constitution. Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 n.41 (1962). In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950),
the Supreme Court refused to adjudicate a challenge to United States military activities in
China, stating, "It is not the function of the judiciary to entertain private litigation.., which
challenges the legality, wisdom, or propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed
forces abroad or to any particular region."
184. In the context of war or military hostilities, the question of possible executive usurpa-
tion of Congress' authority to declare war is clearly a matter for judicial review. Atlee v.
Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898
(D.D.C. 1982). The distinction between justiciable questions of constitutional authority and
nonjusticiable broad challenges to the conduct of foreign policy is whether there exists "judi-
cially manageable standards." DeCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Crockett, 558
F. Supp. at 898.
185. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, arts. 10, 11, 13 & 14 (1948).
186. Id. art. 9.
187. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 1, 87 U.N.T.S. 103.
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rights and freedom of humans.188  Pursuant to that aim, and in con-
junction with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was enacted in 1950.189 The convention is
useful, in that it provides a working system for the international pro-
tection of human rights.' 9°
Although the United States is morally bound by such interna-
tional humanitarian conventions and treaties, traditionally, the viola-
tion of an alien's human rights could be vindicated at the
international level only through diplomatic protest or international
arbitration by the individual's state.19' Moreover, United States
courts have held that individuals, in the absence of a protest from the
offended government, lack standing to assert violations of interna-
tional treaties. 92 This is because treaties are "designed to protect the
sovereign interests of nations, and it is up to the offended nations to
determine whether a violation of sovereign interests occurred and re-
quires redress."' 93 Consistent with that principle, treaties are con-
strued as creating enforceable private rights only if they expressly or
impliedly provide a private right of action.
94
Arguably, Noriega lacked standing to challenge violations of
these treaties, in the absence of a protest by the Panamanian govern-
ment. However, Noriega, as the head of state and de facto ruler of
Panama at the time of the invasion, was the appropriate person to
188. Id.
189. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
190. Id.
191. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1985)
(treaty phrased in "broad generalities" constitutes "declarations of principles, not a code of
legal rights"); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring) (articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter "contain general 'purpose and
principles,' some of which state mere aspirations and none of which can be sensibly thought to
have been intended to be judicially enforceable at the behest of the individuals"); Handel v.
Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (Hague Convention confers no private
right of action on individuals).
192. United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983);
United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980) ("rights under international
common law must belong to the sovereigns and not to individuals . . ."); United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (1 1th Cir. 1986) ("under international law, it is the con-
tracting foreign government that has the right to complain about a violation").
193. United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); see also United States
v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st
Cir. 1981); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cadena,
585 F.2d 1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1979).
194. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
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protest the treaty violations.195 Removing Noriega from power and
installing the new Endara government deprived Noriega of the power
to challenge the treaty violations.
Nevertheless, human rights treaties are designed to protect the
individual. Recent developments in human rights law emphasize that
individuals can claim their substantive rights even against their own
states.1 96 Even assuming Panama failed or refused to protect
Noriega's rights, Noriega may nonetheless assert his personal right to
be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, and abduction in an interna-
tional tribunal.1 97 By failing to abide by these international agree-
ments and customary international law, the United States abandoned
the pursuit of a principled approach to world order.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States is a leader in the international community. Its
actions are closely monitored and often mimicked by other nations.
The invasion of Panama sets a bad precedent for other nations. It
advocates using violent intervention, rather than international diplo-
macy, to solve disputes. The United States' ad hoc approach threat-
ens the integrity of the existing world order. The practical result of
such a policy is the destruction of international legal and political co-
operation, reciprocity, and comity of nations. When a nation with
military and economic superiority dictates the rules of the game, fair-
ness and reciprocity become secondary. In this type of world order,
every nation's survival depends on gaining the favor of superior pow-
ers. Moreover, validating the military invasion of another country
encourages other nations to strengthen their military, rather than de-
velop their role in international jurisprudence.
Absent a principled approach, the invasion of Panama opens the
door to the use of excessive force, through full-scale military invasions
of other sovereigns, to abduct fugitive offenders. The United States
judiciary should refuse to countenance such action. Moreover, the
195. For discussion of the head of state doctrine, see generally Note, The Dictator, Drugs
and Diplomacy By Indictment: Head of State Immunity in United States v. Noriega, 4 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 729 (1989); Comment, The Power of United States Courts to Deny Former Heads of
States Immunity From Jurisdiction, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 355, 356, 358 (1988); Note, Resolv-
ing the Confusion Over Heads of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 169, 170, 179 (1986).
196. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
197. Id.
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executive branch should realize that the long-term effects of such an
ad hoc policy are dangerous and far-reaching.
Frances Y F Ma
This Comment is dedicated to the loving memory of my brother, John T. M. Ma, and
to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. K. C. Ma, for their continuous love and support. Thanks to
Professors Laurie L. Levenson and George C. Garbesi, and to Andrew D. Amerson, Deputy
Attorney General, for their interest and encouragement. Finally, special thanks to the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal.

